Excerpts from Larry May's's chapter on Hobbes in Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy Ed. Cavalier, Gouinlock and Sterba (MacMillan/St. Martin's Press, 1990).

Psychology is as important to Hobbes' ethics as is law and, interestingly, the two combine together in an important way. Surely the most famous passages from Leviathan deal with the highly imaginative thought experiment which Hobbes developed to test his views of human nature and the psychological motivation to obey the law, namely the state of nature. It is quite clear that Hobbes did not envision the state of nature as a historical condition. He said:

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world . . . yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators . . .

But it is equally clear that Hobbes used this thought experiment to set out his views on the relation between psychology and ethics, especially the centrality of self-interest to the concept of natural right.

Hobbes begins his discussion of the mythical state of nature by drawing our attention to three conditions of equality that exist in nature: equality of strength, equality of prudence or ability, and equality of hope. Equality of strength does not imply that each person possesses the same amount of physical strength as the next person, but only that 'the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest'. (Leviathan, EW III 110.) People are of equal strength in the sense that each is endowed with enough physical strength to put the other in fear. Even the strongest must sleep, and then even the weakest can sneak up and put a dagger to such a person's heart. Hobbes regards this vulnerability as a basis for the motivation of fear in human psychology.

The second equality, of prudence or the ability to pursue one's own interests, is a greater 'equality among men, than that of strength'. (Ibid.) Equality of prudence results from the equal opportunity to learn from experience. 'For prudence is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those settings they equally apply themselves unto.' (Ibid.) Thus, like equality of strength, Hobbes does not claim that all people are equal in the amount of their prudence, but only that they are all equally capable of achieving a certain level of ability if they apply themselves. So not only are people relatively equal in strength, but they are also relatively equal in the ability of rationally pursuing their own interests. That people would pursue their own interests, over all else, in the state of nature seems to be largely based on the fear which equality of strength creates.

From this second equality a third develops, the equality of hope. This equality is simply a synthesis of the first two. When two people desire the same thing, neither one backs away; instead, the two become enemies in striving for it. They become enemies because they both perceive themselves as equal in strength and ability, and they thus come to have an equal hope of prevailing in any conflict. Such competition is rendered even more plausible by Hobbes' contention that it is also natural for individual persons to seek gain, safety and reputation, and that it is not uncommon for people to resort to violence to achieve these basic ends. (EW III 112; also see EW II 6n.) All of these natural psychological conditions lead to such a fear among persons as to transform the state of nature into a state of war, 'and such a war as is of every man against every other man'. (EW III 113.) This state of war is totally devoid of all the aspects of society and civilisation which we have come to accept as synonymous with human life itself. By so stating his case, Hobbes explicitly challenges the Aristotelian identification of human life with social life. (EW II 2_3.)

In this state of war, says Hobbes, the continual fear of our neighbours would make our lives reducible to a simple formula: 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. (EW III 113.) It would be solitary because we have no reason to trust anyone else; poor because we have no possible benefit of commerce in such a war; nasty because we are continually threatened and fearful of one another; brutish because we only have time to act on our passions like our fellow animals; and short because the war of all against all results in many untimely and violent deaths. This incredibly pessimistic account of the nature of human life, Hobbes says, is borne out in part by the actions of all of us, when, without any provocation we arm ourselves and lock our doors.

Does [a person] not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do with my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires and the other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person to make it. (EW III 114)

The key to getting out of this miserable condition is the agreement, the contract, to allow for a common power which can make and enforce laws on us, thereby ending the natural war.

Hobbes singles out one particular consequence of the lack of law enforcement in the state of nature:

Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no justice.... Justice, and injustice, are none of the faculties of body, nor mind.... They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. (EW III 115)

This particular consequence is taken up at greater length subsequently in Leviathan in a general discussion of the relation between justice and law.

As a final note on this discussion of our natural self-interested dispositions, it is worth mentioning that Hobbes also identifies three passions which would incline individual persons to seek peace and therefore to seek some way out of the misery of the state of nature. These passions are: (1) 'fear of death'; (2) 'desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living'; and (3) 'hope by their industry to obtain them'.

These passions have the same basis as the threefold equality among persons: strength, prudence and hope. But now people have a strong reason 'which suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature . . .' (EW III 116.) and Hobbes later equates the laws of nature with 'the true moral philosophy'. (EW III 146.)