Plato's Phaedrus

The central theme of this dialogue is Eros. The problem of love serves as the provocation for the speeches, the content of the speeches and the reflection upon speech as a whole.

We find Socrates with Phaedrus, a young man for whom he has a certain kind of erotic inclination. The general setting is that of a situation between a lover and his beloved. The specific unfolding of this situation involves a speech that Phaedrus has heard from the sophist Lysias. In this speech Lysias puts forth the thesis that it is in the self-interest of the beloved to grant favors only to a non-lover. Socrates listens to this speech (the first logos) and then, through a playful compulsion, he offers another along the same theme, but "better composed" (the second logos or Socrates’ first speech).

Though this second speech is correctly composed, its content is bound to the sense of the first speech and, because of this, Socrates rejects it as false. He offers in its place another speech(the third logos or Socrates’ second speech). In his second speech Socrates proposes to tell the truth about love. This is the central moment in the dialogue. It is here, through the use of mythos, that the character of Socrates moves beyond the limitation of the early dialogues and presents us with an image of Plato’s own philosophical position(viz., the theory of the Forms). The remainder of the dialogue revolves around the problem of speech in general, especially with regard to the possibilities of persuasiveness, i.e., rhetoric, and truth. The image of the dialogue as a whole shows us Socrates persuading his beloved to become a lover of wisdom (philosophos) through the truth contained in the second speech.

Outline of the Phaedrus

Prologue(227a - 230e)

Part One — The Three Speeches(231a - 257b)

I. The First Speech(Lysias) (231a - 234c).

II. The Second Speech(Socrates’ First Speech)(237b - 241d)

III. The Third Speech(Socrates’ Second Speech)(244a - 257b).

Part Two — The Nature of Speech(257c — 279c).

I. The Problem of Written Speech(257c — 258e).

II. Speech, Truth, and Rhetoric(259e — 262b).

III. Dialectic(262c — 266b).

IV. Speech and the Soul(269d — 274a).

V. Written and Spoken Speech(274b — 277a).

VI. Summary and Conclusion(277b — 279c).

Prologue(227a — 230e)

Phaedrus encounters Socrates on his way for a walk outside the city walls. He entices Socrates, a lover of speeches, to accompany him by offering to relate a speech given by Lysias on love (GREEK). In this speech Lysias argues that a person should grant his favors to a non-lover instead of a lover (227c).

Socrates, who we may suppose is in some sense a "lover" of Phaedrus, is intrigued by the double possibility of bearing a speech and being with Phaedrus. He agrees to walk with Phaedrus beyond the city walls. But, as Socrates says later on, this is a gesture he seldom makes. His fondness of learning leads him to the people in the market place and not to the trees in the forest (230d).

During the walk Phaedrus and Socrates exchange a brief account of the truth (GREEK) of mythic tales (GREEK)(224c — 230a). Socrates says that he has no time for reducing mythos to rational explanation. It is not the refutation of the gods that he is interested in, but rather the task of self-knowledge. He accepts the customary beliefs about the myths and with this he indicates that there might exist some relationship of myth to truth. The peculiar kind of relationship implied here will be seen in Socrates’ second speech when a myth is used to convey the truth about love (the role of mythos will then emerge as a powerful expression for the image of truth).

After a while, an enchanting place is found under a tree by the river Ilissus. They settle down amidst sacred figurines and the summer music of the cicadas. Phaedrus begins to read the speech of Lysias.

The First Speech (Lysias) (231a — 234c).

It is to be remarked at the outset that Plato is deliberately presenting us with an image of a bad speech. It is bad with regard to both form and content. The former aspect involves a loose and rambling structure which is utterly disorganized, save for its rhetorical attempt to constantly repeat its central theme. This them, which forms the content of the speech and which will later be rejected by Socrates in his second speech, expresses the opinion that a person should only give himself a non-lover, never to a person in love with him.

The reason why a beloved should avoid a lover and befriend a non-lover lies in the principle of self-interest. It is to the advantage of each person that such a bond occur, for in this case each will give to the other a constant satisfaction. In the case of a lover, however, the situation becomes confused and chaotic, passions and jealousies rising and falling as the mood determines. At bottom, Lysias affirms the common belief that love is a kind of madness. It is on account of this madness that the lover cannot be trusted.

Thus the conclusion is that the beloved should accept the advances of the non-lover and reject the advances of the lover, for only in the first instance is the situation mutually advantageous (231a, 234c).

Interlude(234d — 237a).

Socrates remarks about how Phaedrus was caught up in the rhetorical force of Lysias’ speech, and yet it was precisely here that the speech was so obviously lacking (235a). Phaedrus challenges Socrates to compose a better speech and promises to erect golden statues at Delphi if the challenge can be met (235d). Socrates coyly declines but, Phaedrus playfully threatens him first with force and then with something more persuasive viz., the threat of no longer engaging in discourse (236c-e).

Socrates assents, but because the speech must be similar in content to Lysias’ (236b) and because Socrates will ultimately disagree with it, he hides his head so as not to be seen giving such a speech(237a).

The Second Speech (Socrates’ first speech)(237b — 241d).

This speech makes a marked improvement over Lysias’ speech and most importantly in regard to its form. It is the image of a speech that is rhetorically correct. That is to say, it is a speech that progresses in an orderly and persuasive manner. The nature of this order is that of a certain kind of collecting and dividing which Socrates later describes as dialectic (265d — 266c). It is this method of collection and division that gives the Platonic Socrates a path from the side of episteme or knowledge, towards the eidos. This theory is most extensively worked out in the Sophist. Through this collection and division Socrates is able to arrive at a certain definition of love and a certain amount of the love relationship. The speech involves the following stages: (1) the invocation of the Muses (237a — b); (2) the situation (237b); (3) the need for definition and the defining of eros (237c — 238c); (4) interlude (238c — d); (5) the reasons for rejecting the lover (238e — 241d).

(1) The speech begins with the invocation of the Muses. It is an acknowledgement of the strangeness of the place where Phaedrus and Socrates have come to rest. The music of the cicadas and the rippling of the river punctuate the voice of the speechmaker. The place appears to be surrounded by the musical piping of those in the service of eros.

(2) Socrates begins with a preface that describes the setting of the speech. The lover of a young boy disguises his true feeling and pretends to be a non-lover. From the perspective of this lie he argues, in accord with Lysias’ thesis, that favors ought to be granted to a non-lover rather than a lover (237b).

(3) The speech proper begins with the disguised lover showing the need for a definition (GREEK) of love. Such a definition would preclude any confusion over the terms being used. Socrates begins by "collecting" that which belongs to both the lover and the non-lover. He shows that both parties partake of desire (GREEK), since both desire the beauty of the beloved (237d).

The next stage involves a "division" of this desire and in such a way as to show what it is that distinguishes the lover from the non-lover. Socrates performs this division by means of the "two ruling and guiding principles" of all human beings viz., the natural desire for pleasure (GREEK) and acquired opinion (GREEK) which strives for the best (GREEK)(237d — e). When opinion is guided by reason (GREEK) it is called moderation(GREEK)(238a). When desire for pleasure is irrationally (GREEK) in control, it is called excess(GREEK)(238a).

Now the non-lover is moderate and is rationally guided by what is in his self-interest. The lover, however, suffers from an excessive desire for beauty and, indeed, to such an extent that he appears "mad." This madness, born of excessive desire for beauty, is properly called love (GREEK)(238c; also 244a). Thus the definition of eros, discovered by this method of collection and division, appears schematically as follows:

Desire

(lover and non-lover)

lover irrational, excessive rational, moderate non-lover

(partaking (free

of eros) from eros)

From this it will be seen that it is to the beloved’s advantage to accept the rational and moderate non-lover rather than the irrational and excessive lover.

(4) Socrates breaks the speech at this point, as if waking from a trance. He comments about how he feels in an inspired state of mind (GREEK) and of how the place seems filled with a divine (GREEK) presence. The reference is to the strangeness of this spot by the river Illius and, in this context, it points directly back to the invocation of the Muses at the beginning of the speech. It is as if Socrates has been carried away by the mythic surroundings of his discourse and is in fact singing a song that he has no control over. He states specifically that he is caught by the nymphs (GREEK) and almost uttering dithyrambs (GREEK) (238d).

Interlude (241e — 243e)

Socrates ends the speech abruptly, saying that it is finished at this description of the lover. He notes how his speech had reached an almost "musical roar" (gr). It is as if he had become possessed by the nymphs that Phaedrus had exposed him to in asking him to compose such a speech (241e).

Socrates then attempts to cross the river and return to the city. But his daemon (gr) holds him back (242b). He divines the purpose of this approbation as a sign that he has sinned against the god of love, Aphrodite. Both speeches, insofar as they spoke ill against the lover (and eo ipso Love itself), were simplistic (gr) and impious (gr) (242d). There is need, therefore, of a purification (gr) and a purification of a special kind known not to Homer but to Stesichorus. A recantation is needed which will involve a certain kind of poem (gr) (243a). The purification that Socrates must undergo for his impiety against Aphrodite is another speech about love. He mentions that his head will be bared throughout this third speech, indicating thereby that there is nothing shameful being said, but rather that the truth is being spoken (243b).

The Third Speech (Socrates’ Second Speech) (244a — 257b).

Prior to the beginning of our thematic discussion, it might be helpful to situate the place of this speech within the dramatic setting of the dialogue as a whole. Up till now we have had a situation in which the problem of eros has been at play with regard to all three Platonic aspects of logos, mythos, and ergon (see John Sallis, Being and Logos).

Logos has been present insofar as there have been two speeches made with eros as a their central theme. Mythos has been seen in the very surroundings in which the speeches have been made. Socrates has often remarked about this and has once even raised to the level of a little speech the possibility that myths might be true (cf 229c — 230a). More specifically, myths have served to account for the musical tones present in Socrates’ first speech, a speech that has served to incense the figures of Aphrodite and Eros.

It is to be noted, moreover, that these speeches and myths about love have occurred in the presence of two persons who are involved, in deed, in a kind of erotic interplay. The actual situation between Socrates and Phaedrus is one of a lover and a beloved. Thus both theme and action become intertwined, with myth serving as the unifying ground.

This entire interplay will now be taken to a new level. In the upcoming speech Socrates will give a true logos about love (eros) and in such a way as to make manifest his actual relationship to Phaedrus. In telling the truth about love (the logos) Socrates will actually be making love to Phaedrus (the ergon). Furthermore, the ultimate vehicle for the truth-telling will be mythos i.e., it will be the myth of the soul that will reveal the truth about love and convince Phaedrus that Socrates is his love.

The first sentence serves to distinguish this speech from the former and to show it in what manner it differs. The previous speech was related to the son of Pythocles from Myrrhinus. This reference plays on the etymological sense of one who is "Eager for Fame" and from "Myrhtown." It was not a serious speech, though it may have been convincing and popular. The present speech, however, is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus (Man of Pious Speech) from Himera (Town of Desire). It is the recantation of a pious man who shall speak truthfully about love (244a).

We could characterize the three speeches by saying that the first was both incorrect (with regard to its form or structure) and false (with regard to its content or substance) the second was correct but false, while the third will be both correct and true.

Love as Madness(244a — 245b)

One of the marks of a lover is madness (cf Lysis 204c-d, 205a). Now Socrates accepts this criterion but, in this true speech about love, he states that this ought not to be a reason to reject the lover in favor of the non-lover.

If it were a simple fact that madness (gr) was a pure evil, then of course this would be true. But it is Socrates’ contention that madness can be a gift from the gods and when this is so it is good and a great blessing (244a). This contention must now be proved. As a first step Socrates lists ("collects") several kinds of divine madness i.e., madness that is not an evil but a good.

First there is prophecy (gr) which reveals the aid of madness to those who are to convey divine truth(244b). One also sees the aid of madness in purifications (gr) which release persons from their ills and errors (244e). A third kind of madness comes from the Muses (gr) and inspires one to music and poetry (244e — 245a). [We must note how Socrates himself is bound to these forms of madness. His life task was conveyed under the conditions of prophecy viz., the Delphic Oracle, he is correctly undergoing a purification for his sin against Eros and the very place of the purification is filled with the presence of the Muses].

The result of this listing is to show that there are positive senses of madness. Therefore, all things being equal, one ought not to fear this event and say to the beloved, "stay away from the lover for he is mad." In fact, the reverse might be the case if love was a positive form of madness. This, indeed, is what Socrates specifically indicates, namely, that love (gr) is the fourth kind of madness and, as a gift from the gods, it ought to be one of our greatest blessings (245b).

[But the first stage has only shown that there is a sense in which madness can be a good (each of the instances has shown this). It still remains to show that such madness is given by the gods for our happiness. In order to do this Socrates must say something about our souls, for it is here that we are affected by madness and it is here that we find happiness. This is the connecting link which leads one from a discussion of love as madness to a discussion of the soul (psyche)(245c)].

The Nature of the Soul (245c — 246a).

The method of collection and division points out the need to grasp the whole and then delineate the parts. Consequently, the speech contends that we must learn something about the soul both human (gr) and divine (gr). We must do this by observing how the soul acts (gr) and how it is acted upon (gr) i.e., we must learn about the soul by learning about its activities (245c). The beginning of this setting forth (gr) of the activity of the soul involves a discussion of the soul’s immortality (gr) vis a vis its activity as self-moving. It is to be noted that the sense of "proof" here is Apodeisis i.e, a "setting forth." The first stage (gr) is a description of the soul’s immortality. We must be cautious about seeing too much in this so-called proof. It is merely a stage in a general story about the soul and as such its purpose is not so much to "prove" the immortality of the soul as it is to show us something about the activity of the soul as manifested by its immortal nature. It is only here that we gain a sense of the place of this proof within the overall Apodeisis. We shall begin our showing forth of the soul by stating something, about the movement (gr) of the soul (245c).

The "formal proof" for the immortality of the soul is as follows. (1) That which moves itself (gr) has the quality of never ceasing. (2) That which moves itself is the source (gr) of all which moves. (3) That which is the source of movement in all others cannot itself have a source (i.e., cannot itself have been produced). Therefore, (4) the soul must always have been. At this stage the regressive element in the proof has been established. It follows the Pythagorean belief that the soul has always existed prior to its incarnation. The final conclusion is based upon this belief that the soul is unproduced. (5) That which is unproduced is imperishable i.e., indestructible and therefore immortal (245c —246a).

The key point in all this is that the nature of the soul involves motion. The very essence of its immortality lies in its self-motion (245e). Now it is from here that the rest of the proof or self-showing will progress. We had begun by stating the need for proving that love is a kind of madness that is given by the gods for our greatest happiness. The qualities of madness and happiness are predicates of the soul and so there evolved the need to investigate the soul. The significance of the proof lies in the fact that it has established the nature (gr) of the soul, a nature which is bound up with the concept of self-motion (245e). The Apodeisis now begins to move towards its most fundamental expression by discussing, in mythological terms, the movement of the soul with regard to its form (gr) (246a). That is to say, attention is shifted away from its nature (viz., self-motion) to its form (viz., the ways and manner of its self-motion).

The Mythos: The Movement of the Soul(246a — 249d).

The task now before the speech maker is to tell truly about the soul. Yet such a task, Socrates says, is a divine discourse and one that no mortal can easily attempt. The best that one can do under the present circumstances is to convey an image (gr) of the soul (246a). Hence the form or eidos of the soul will be presented through an image of the soul.

Socrates likens the soul to a pair of winged horses and a charioteer (246a). In the case of the gods, the horses and charioteer are noble and good (gr). But in the case of mortals one of the horses is ill-trained and troublesome, thus making the movement of the chariot difficult (246b). Later in the dialogue, this description is elaborated (253c — 254e). The mortal soul is a tripartite consisting of Reason (the charioteer), spirit (the good horse) and irrational emotion (the bad horse) (cf. Republic i.e., 441e — 442b). Now, this distinction between the god’s steed and the mortal’s steed lies behind the following distinction between living beings as mortal and immortal.

Although all soul is immortal, some souls lose their wings and begin a downward movement that culminates in an embodiment on earth that we designate as human beings (mortal living beings) (246c). This downward movement has been caused by the soul’s having lost its wings. It is this problem, which will ultimately be the problem of the human condition, which Socrates now addresses. The next sections of the speech will seek to describe the manner in which the soul loses its wings. Socrates begins by first giving us the nature of the wing (246d —e) and then describing the life of both gods (247a —e) and mortals (248a —249d).

The nature (gr) of the wing is to move upward toward the place of the gods (246d). It is that which partakes of the divine (gr). But that which is divine, in accord with Platonic theory, is the Beautiful, the Wise, the Good etc. Thus it is the nature of the wing to move upward to this divine sphere where in some manner, the qualities of the Beautiful and the Good etc. can be found. It is here, the speaker asserts, that the soul receives its proper nourishment (246e), for it is this sphere that the soul is most properly suited to understand.

We are now given an image of the life of the gods, whose souls are such that they can properly partake of their nourishment. Zeus (the very image of upward movement and thus the central god of this dialogue) leads an array of gods and their followers to a feast and banquet. Those chariots that are completely good and noble proceed steeply upward to the very edge of the spherical heavens. It is here, the speaker claims, that the winged soul takes its stand on the outer surface of heaven and gazes upon which is beyond the heavens (gr) i.e., that which is beyond physis or nature in the widest sense (247c). This is the feasting of the soul and we are told that which is feasted upon is not anything within the universe of physical beings.

It is at this point that Socrates re-emphasizes the difficulty of the speech. He states that what is about to be said has never been uttered by an earthly poet (gr) nor will it ever be. It is not the poetical that emerges here, but the truth (gr) itself; this is a true speech (gr) (247c). We are at the nodal point of the dialogue. Socrates states that that which the soul feasts upon as that which is most properly its own i.e., that which is properly correlated to the soul’s natural functions is nothing else than Being (gr) itself(247c). It is this colorless, figureless, intangible realm which constitutes the proper sphere of the soul’s attention and which finishes the mark of true knowledge (gr) (247c — d). True knowledge is thus a knowledge of Being and it is the winged soul that has access to this sphere.

But what else is said here about this nourishment, this Being? It is "visible" (gr) only to the mind (gr) , which is the pilot of the soul(247c). What is it that is visible this way though, we may conjecture, it is invisible in an earthly sense? It i s that which is a unity running through a great diversity e.g., the Absolute sense of Justice from which every particular instance of justice must somehow "partake." That is to say, this nourishment is the real eternal absolute (gr) for which earthly instances are merely shadows (247d —e).

Again, the image portrays the realm of Being as being beyond the realm of the visible, tangible etc., which is to say, the realm of Being is beyond the realm of beings as everyday, thing-like entities. It is accessible only to a divine-like mind. Thus it is through mind (nous) and not through the senses (gr) that one grasps that which is, in principle, beyond the sphere of sensation.

And so we have, on the one hand, the cosmos with its earthly instances of justice, knowledge, etc., and, on the other hand, that which is beyond the cosmos and in which there lies absolute Justice, Absolute Knowledge, etc. It is this latter realm that is the proper object of the divine and that which is divine in the souls of mortals, namely, mind or Reason. It is only in this realm that the soul receives its proper nourishment. Socrates concludes the image by noting that once this has been accomplished the soul returns to the cosmos and attends to its other parts viz., the "horses," by feeding them on Ambrosia and Nector (247e).

Before moving to the next section, it might do us well to state a thematic problem at issue here which will anticipate a later discussion. What must be felt throughout this whole image is a tension between two realms e.g., the realm of absolute Justice and the realm of justice. One might wonder about the connection, if any, between these two spheres, spheres which we might characterize in the broadest sense as the spheres of Being and beings. What is the relationship between Being and beings? And what is the significance of one being visible while the other is somehow invisible (except to the mind)? This whole problem of what can be called the ontological Difference is at issue in the image of the Divided Line (cf Republic 509d —511e). It is here that we will be able to discuss fully the sense of the connection between the two realms.

Aside: The term "Being" retains the obscurity and wonder of the phenomenon which would be lost if the translation followed the Latinized and modernized movement from say, ousia to substantia to "substance" as that which is "real" or "truly real" (e.g., "Reality"). We can gain a glimpse of the problem at issue here by referring to an early lecture given by Heidegger at the University of Marburg: "the Ontological Difference… is the distinction between beings (Seiendem) and Being (Sein). The Ontological Difference says beings are always characterized through a definite constitution of Being (Seinsver fassung). [But] this Being itself is not a being. Herein lies the darkness -- how a being belongs to Being." Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, s.109.

Resuming our place in the dialogue we should recall that up till now Socrates has given an image of how the gods feast at the Banquet. The story-teller next describes how the other souls attempt access to the Banquet of Being (248a —b). Many of these souls have a bad horse which, because of its tendency toward the visible i.e., the sensible, constantly drags the chariot downwards and causes much trouble for the charioteer. At bottom this means that very few mortal souls feast upon Being but rather must only get an occasional glimpse of that which is beyond the cosmos (and for many of these this vision is soon forgotten). The dark horses drag these souls about and, if the drivers have not trained and tempered their horses i.e., learned to control that tendency of the dark horse toward the earthly realm, then there is strife and confusion which eventually leads to the damage and loss of the wings. And yet it is precisely on the pastures of Being that the wing, which has been damaged, receives its proper nourishment (248b).

This situation, which might form Plato’s vision of the Human Condition, can be expressed as follows. Mortal souls contain within themselves a part that is, in principle, antithetical to that realm beyond the cosmos. The dark horse by its very nature plummets downwards and, because of this innate process, the wings become damaged and lost through the contradictory tendencies of the soul to move upwards (through the mind) while being drawn downwards (through the desires of the senses). It is this contradictory tendency that accounts for the confusion and commotion amongst the many souls in the legions of the gods (248b).

Finally, there is the cyclical reincarnation of the soul based upon its just (or unjust) appropriation of its allotted time upon earth. It is to be noted that though the process of reincarnation takes 10, 000 years, the journey of the highest forms of life takes only 3,000 years (i.e., it is this form of life that is godlike and most pleasing to the gods). One who lives thusly, Socrates says, is either a genuine lover of wisdom or a lover concerned with a love for wisdom (gr) (249a). But those who live the most genuine life i.e., those of a philosophical nature (249c) appear to the many around them to be misguided and strange. Indeed, the highest form of life appears, from the perspective of the other forms of life, to be mad (249d).

With this, the discussion of the movement of the soul draws to a close. Note how a clustering of terms has begun to reveal the true theme of the speech. First, the highest forms of life all involved the notion of a lover viz., a lover of wisdom, a lover of beauty, a musical and erotic (loving) nature. Indeed, the genuine lover of wisdom, or "the philosophical lover" was to be seen as most pleasing to the gods. Yet, secondly, one who partakes of such a life appears mad to those who live a "down to earth" existence. Thus the two terms of love and madness re-emerge at this point in the dialogue. The speech is explicit about this in the following section.

Love and Beauty (249d — 257b).

Let’s begin this section with an overview. Socrates proclaims that his whole speech has been "about that fourth kind of madness," namely, love or eros (249d). How so?

The speech began with the problem of love and madness. Now love and madness pertain to the soul and thus to know fully about these phenomena is to tell a story about the soul. This, indeed, is what has been taking place.

The interconnection of the whole speech is made specifically portrayed when we see that the previous part of the speech ended with a lover of wisdom and the comments upon how and why that person appears mad. This "appearance" had to do with his or her seeing Being at the Banquet and remembering this through a life which practiced for such a memory i.e., a life that did not lose and forget itself in earthly concerns. This is the highest form of madness and one who partakes of it is rightly called a lover. One conclusion reached this far in the speech is that the Philosopher is a lover of Being.