Sections 16, 17, and 18

Review

Chapter 3 is concerned with the structure of the 'in-the-world', its task is to uncover the meaning of 'world' within the Dasein Analytic. To this end Heidegger began with that 'world' which is immediately 'around us' ie das Umwelt (the environment) and sought to uncover the manner in which Dasein comports itself therein. It was seen that Dasein does so in terms of its dealings and that the Being of those entities which it so encounters has the character of readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit)

Now bear in mind the task of this chapter and what has thus been uncovered ie the concept of world and the structure of readiness-to-hand. For we are going to want to see how these will merge together and at the same time be bound up with Dasein (section 18)

But before we can enter into this investigation, we must first seek a phenomenal justification for the structure of Zuhandenheit. This is the task of Sections 16 and 17. Here Heidegger will describe the manner in which the phenomenal structures themselves disclose the phenomenon of world.

Section 16

This will provide us with (a) preliminary evidence for the structure of Zuhandenheit, (b) indicate the relation between Zuhandenheit and a second ontological categorical structure viz, Vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand) and (c) a preliminary indication of the worldhood of the world.

The opening paragraphs are methodological: Heidegger discusses the possibility of the 'world' lighting up within Dasein's pre-ontological understanding: and if this occurs, then it will be possible to hold this phenomenon 'at bay' and study it. This is the task of Section 16: to investigate certain (in this case 'privative') phenomenal structures in order to see what they might 'light up' and in such a way that we will be able to 'hold on' to what is thus uncovered in 'the things themselves'. Heidegger examines three structures (all revolving around equipment becoming 'un-usable'). In each case that which we are concernfully caught up with in its usability becomes in some sense un-usable, it loses its character as ready-to-hand and with this break in our activity something announces itself.

(1) Conspicuousness (Auffalligkeit--from Auffalen: 'to attract attention', to become noticeable') Here something becomes unusable within what is ready-to-hand e.g. a pencil breaking: the pencil 'lies there' before one is conspicuoiusness, pure presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) announces itself

(2) Obtrusiveness (Aufdringlichkeit) That which is missing from what is ready-to-hand makes that which is ready-to-hand become obtrusive e.g. when a pencil is missing the work 'lies there' before one (and here to , presence-at-hand announces itself).

(3) Obstinacy (Aufsassigkeit from Afusassig: 'rebellious') Some other concern 'calls our attention' and, in so doing, reveals the presence-at-hand of what 'lies before' us, the obstinacy of our present task that 'demands' completion. E.g. the 'arrival of' dinner makes our 'work' 'stand in the way' of our new concern- it stares at us and demands completion (or anger, or some other response).

There are two structures that are disclosed in this analysis

(1) In these modes of 'unusability' what is briefly announced is the structure of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). In each case our activity is 'broken', our primary relationship to our dealing is jarred and a certain degree of dis-engagement take place: that which is before us takes on the character of 'mere stuff' for a moment becomes a 'thing' in our way. Yet in these cases our concern always 'pushes on' and the structure of Zuhandenheit is still present even in the momentary lapses into Vorhandenheit. This discloses an interconnection between the two structures and also shows in what sense Zuhandenheit is primary viz. our primary relationship to entities within the world is one of readiness-at-hand.

Now what does this say about 'world'?

(2) In this 'breaking down' of Zuhandenheit into Vorhandenheit there is briefly 'lit up' the structure of readiness-to-hand for what gets disturbed in these modes are the assignments and references with which the equipment was bound up. With this lights up the referential context of the equipmental totality e.g., a broken hammer will 'light up' the workshop. And Heidegger says, with this referential totality--the world announces itself.

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Thus 'world' and 'a referential totality of equipmental context' are somehow bound to one another.

Section 17

This section seeks to make explicit what has been 'announced' by 'the things themselves' in section 16. Specifically, the task of section 17 will be to investigate a structure that has in itself (without any 'privative' modes) the possibility of announcing the worldhood of the world, or, as we can now say, the referential totality.

two movements (a) a general discussion of 'reference', relation and indicating (the reference here is to Husserl (in Ideas & LI) (b) a specific discussion of signs.

(a) General distinction:

All tools (Zeug) have reference (Verweisung), but only signs (Zeichen) indicate (Zeign) A system of references cannot be reduced to a system of signs--however, a sign might have a disclosive relationship to a system of references. This, indeed, will be what will make signs a particularly important phenomenal structure.

(b) The Nature of Signs

Signs are items of equipment whose specific character involves 'a kind of showing', that in their very function as indicating they are, we could say, 'indicative' of something, they serve to show or announce something. As an item of equipment a sign belongs to an equipmental totality, it is involved in a system of reference, but most importantly, it has the peculiar function of 'lighting up' that very system of reference that it is involved in.

For instance, a 'turn signal' on a car is involved in the equipmental totality of the car (as are the 'nuts & bolts' in the engine) but what it serves to 'light up' in the whole world of transportation (the rules of the road, the 'position' of cars, directions, gas stations, accommodations, etc.) This sign addresses itself to the aroundness of the environment and in so doing, announces that environment.

80/111 "signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something"

Heidegger discusses this further in terms of 'making a sign': in such a task the function of a sign reveals itself as involved in making something conspicuous. And what, specifically, is made conspicuous is a certain totality of equipment: signs show us the equipment they are involved with.

80/110 "A sign is an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection"

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The special status of signs: signs have the equivocal structure of (a) being something ready-to-hand and (b) being able to indicate the phenomenon of readiness-to-hand (cfh82/114)

Note that what signs 'show' us is a referential totality. Section 18 must think this through, it must think through this notion of Reference (Verweisung).

Section 18

To speak of the nature of Zuhandenheit as structurally constituted by reference (and referential totalities) is to say that an item of equipment is somehow involved in those references.

(1) What is the Being of entities within our environment? Readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit)

(2)What is the Being of readiness-to-hand? Involvement (Bewandtnis)

Equipment is not free floating nor is reference--there is always a king of involvement (Bewandtnis) Heidegger says, the Being which belongs to readiness-to-hand is Involvement (84/115). Now what is this relationship of reference and involvement, what is the nature of this involvement which 'involves' the being of equipment? Let's take an example to clarify this: an item of equipment is involved with other equipment (an equipmental totality) but this can also be involved in a series of involvement's (in a totality of involvement's) e.g., a hammer (having the structure of 'in order to...') can be involved in a 'towards which...' (of, say, a house): thus, hammer--hammering--making something fast--protection from bad weather--providing shelter for Dasein. In this last case, the 'towards which...' of the totality of involvement's reaches a point where we no longer speak of equipment but of Dasein--where we speak of a 'for the sake of...'

At this point the being of readiness-to-hand, that is to say, the referential totality, the totality of involvement's (which we can speak of as 'world') becomes structurally connected to the Being of Dasein (chapter 5 investigates this further)

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Here Heidegger pursues the sense of 'letting something be involved' This is a difficult phrase--it implies a manner in which Dasein lets entities be, a manner in which Dasein 'frees' entities for an involvement. This Freigabe ('freeing') in an ontological structure--it means that, ability of Dasein to 'allow' entities to become ready-to-hand, to 'free them', if you will, to become equipment. This kind of allowing (or 'freeing') really has its ground in Dasein's understanding or comprehension (only because there is Dasein, can there 'be' equipment) [Richardson p. 57 'this pre-ontic letting-be of the instrument as a being is a condition of the possibility of the encounter with the instrument as such and such (e.g. a hammer)]

Here we can see Dasein as ground for the Being of equipment (Zuhandenheit) and with this as ground for 'world', but--in our everyday dealings we constantly encounter entities that have already been freed within a context before us. Indeed, we are immersed within a totality of involvement's that is there before us. Ontically, we are not so much a ground of the world, as in the world, Dasein is in-the-world. What we have to account for here is (1) the fact that Dasein does not spontaneously 'world' and yet (2) Dasein is still the ground for the world (as a referential totality)

How are these brought together? by saying that the world (as totality of involvement's) is that wherein Dasein understandingly comports itself.

(a) Dasein as grounded in-the-world

(b) Dasein as ground of the world

(1) the world is a totality constituted by the totality of involvement's

However,

(2) the constitution of involvement's (the a priori 'letting be involved') are generated by Dasein (ie Dasein' very existence in an unfolding, a constituting of worldhood)

Again,

(1) Dasein's self comportment pre-supposes 'world' (i.e. existence presupposes world i.e. Dasein exists as in-the-world)

but yet

(2) existence constitutes world

In existing Dasein is always already in the world and yet, in existing, unfolds worldhood.

This is the dual relation of Dasein and Welt.