Second Introduction

The Second Introduction

In the overview we have already indicated how the two introductions to Being and Time are interrelated, how the 1st Introduction formulates the question to be asked while the 2nd Introduction determines the method to be used in 'answering' the question.

Accordingly, the main focus here will be upon Heidegger's discussion of 'method', specifically, his discussion of the method of Phenomenology (section 7).

Prior to this, however, let's briefly look at sections 5 and 6 with special regard to our task (i.e., section 7)

Section 5 (basically an 'overview' of the task for the treatise)

Note that Dasein has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the world i.e., Dasein has a tendency to understand itself in the manner in which it understands things in the world. And with this we could say provisionally that Dasein has a tendency to understand itself in terms of that which it is not.

Dasein has a tendency to 'misunderstand itself', Dasein has a tendency towards self-concealment. With this, Heidegger wants us to feel the need for approaching Dasein in such a way that it doesn't misunderstand itself, in such a way that it show itself as it 'really is,' in such a way that it show itself for itself (and not from something 'other' than it is).

And with this we should feel the need for determining a method that will allow for such a showing forth, that will allow something to show itself from itself.

Section 6 (the problem of history- the task of 'destroying' the history of ontology)

Note (H21/42): Heidegger not only says that Dasein has a 'tendency' to interpret itself in terms of 'world' but also Dasein falls prey to tradition i.e., it tends to interpret itself in terms of a tradition that it has taken over.

And this tradition itself, Heidegger contends, has served to conceal Dasein from itself (by interpreting it according to 'categories' which do not belong to Dasein) And so one again, there is felt the need for a method that would allow Dasein to 'show itself from itself', that would serve to uncover the nature of Dasein, rather than to conceal it.

Re: The Method of Phenomenology

Historically, there are several places where one can find important formulations of the method of phenomenology. Here are some samples:

(1) Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology and The Paris Lectures
(2) Martin Heidegger: "The Phenomenological method of investigation" (section 7 of Being and Time)
(3) Jean-Paul Sartre: The Transcendence of the Ego
(4) Merleau-Ponty: The "Preface" (Phenomenology of Perception)

Section 7 The Phenomenological method of Investigation

Introduction

The second introduction is an attempt to discover the method appropriate to an investigation of Being (and, most specifically, of the Being of Dasein).

Now the method most appropriate for an investigation of Being (i.e., fundamental ontology) will be phenomenology -- here is the connection: Ontology must be governed by the necessities that arise from 'the things themselves' (Sachen sebst) and this is also what governs phenomenology. Recall Husserl's phrase Zu De Sachen Selbst ('to the matters, issues themselves').

Remember also that phenomenology is essentially a method, not a 'body of doctrine'.

Now, Heidegger's discussion of phenomenology as a methodological conception involves a kind of 'dividing and collecting' (i.e., the term is broken down into 'phenomenon' and 'logos', then re-joined into 'phenomenology'). In doing this, Heidegger wishes to provide a preliminary indication of what this method consists of.

A. The Concept of Phenomenon
B. The Concept of the Logos
C. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology

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