Phenomenon

A. The concept of 'Phenomenon'

What Heidegger will do here is to note four interconnected structures of 'phenomenon' which, in turn, will yield three conceptions (notions) of 'phenomenon'

And what we shall be interested in will be the phenomenological conception of 'phenomenon'. (This will, by anticipation, be something like the Being of beings i.e., the 'phenomena' of phenomenology will be that which underlies the particular manifestations of beings. Again, by anticipation, the 'phenomenon' that we want to get at is the Being of Dasein i.e., the Care Structure.)

The 4 possible structures of a 'phenomenon' (sich zeigen)

1. Phenomenon 'that which shows itself'

Here Heidegger has recourse to the Greek conception. And his analysis of the Greek terms concludes with the statement that 'phenomena' means that which shows itself or makes itself manifest.

Connecting this to the Greek word for 'light,' we have something "showing itself by bringing itself to light" (this is what the etymological play brings to light).

From this Heidegger wants to give the primary expression to 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in [from] itself (das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeingende).

Put most simply, 'phenomenon', in this primary sense, is a kind of showing.

(As we shall see, each other expression of 'phenomenon' will have something to do with this 'showing'.)

2. Seeming (Scheinen)

One way in which 'phenomena' can 'show themselves' is in a privative manner viz a kind of showing itself as what it (in itself) is not -- Heidegger calls this seeming or semblance. (e.g., a stick in water seems broken). This is the sense in which 'seeming' is a privative modification of 'phenomenon'.

Note also how the 'seeming' of the 'broken stick' is structurally connected to the straight stick--Heidegger wants to say that the structure of Scheinen is grounded upon the structure of Phanomen.

Heidegger now moves on to two 'more distinct' (but not radically separate) structures of 'phenomenon' ('Appearance' & 'mere appearance')

3. Appearance (Erscheinung)

This structure is complex i.e., it itself involves two structural moments.

General description: something which shows itself in such a way as to announce something else does not show itself (e.g., 'symptoms of a disease'--X's announcing itself in and through Y--"red patches 'announce' an infection: the infection, in turn, is the ground for the appearance of the red patches").

(i) that which appears ('the infection'): this is the 'something' which does not show itself, but appears through something which does show itself (the red patches).

(ii) the appearance ('the red patches'): that which shows itself in such a way as to announce that which appears ('the infection').

[Question: How crucial is that structure? Will we be able to make an analogy here with the relationship between the ontic and ontological levels of the Dasein Analytic? That is, will ontic everydayness serve to 'announce' the ontological structures that underlie it and make it possible?]

Regardless, it is important to note that appearance involves a duality structure of showing (rather than a privative showing). And although its structure is complex, this relation to a kind of showing connects it to the primodial sense of "phanomen."

Finally,

4. Mere Appearance

This is a reference to the Kantian concept of 'appearance'. The appearance announces 'the thing in itself' in such a way that the thing in itself can never, in principle, become manifest or appear. The appearance shines forth from the non-manifest in such a way that that which is announced is essentially covered up. (As the 'categories' of our perceptions prevent us from 'seeing' anything outside such categories.)

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These various senses of 'phenomenon' are exhibited in order to bring to light the distinguishing characteristics of the 'phenomena' of phenomenology [in view of the traditional interpretations].

Heidegger: phenomenon= sich zeigen (a self-showing)
Tradition: phenomenon= appearance (mere appearance) and seeming.

More specifically, Heidegger goes on to explicitly identify the phenomenological sense of 'phenomenon'.

1. The Formal Conception: Phenomenon is that which shows itself in [from] itself. (this is a non-committal signification). Most simply, a kind of showing.

2. The ordinary conception: Phenomena as the 'objects' of our intuitions, that which we perceive. These are 'appearances' as we ordinarily understand them. They fall under the formal concept of phenomenon in as much as they involve a kind of showing.

But, phenomena as ordinarily conceived are not the 'phenomena of phenomenology'. (Though this will constitute the 'phenomenal content' which shall be interpreted.)

3. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon is more akin to the Kantian forms of intuition than to 'filled in', concrete intuition.

It is that which necessarily accompanies all 'appearances' but does so in a non-obvious (i.e., unthematic) way. Thus, the phenomena in the phenomenological sense do not simply show themselves. They show themselves unthematically, they must be brought to show themselves in a more direct (thematic) self showing.

The phenomenon of phenomenology is nothing less than the Being of beings.

Hence, a phenomenological investigation of Dasein will presumably attempt to articulate (logos) the Being of Dasein, to thematize the unthematic manifestion of the phenomena of phenomenology.

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