(B) The Concept of Logos
Heidegger begins with the Greek sense of Logos. He discusses four senses
of the term -- which in turn leads to an explanation of the traditional
translation of Logos in the threefold sense of ratio (reason,
ground and relation)
I want to discuss the four senses of logos that Heidegger discusses
and how they relate back to the primary sense.
(1) The basic sense of Logos is Rede
Now, we can translate this as discourse if we constantly keep in mind the
formal structure involved: to make manifest what one is talking about, that
is to say, logos is a kind of making manifest.
This is seen more precisely in the Aristotelian sense of apophainesthai:
"to let something be seen."
Logos has the character of letting what is talked about become
manifest from the very matters talked about.
Notice that in this formal, primary sense we have more a kind of seeing
involved (e.g., Sehenlassen) than a kind of 'hearing' (thus silence
can be a mode of Rede, a way of 'making manifest').
Logos , in its primary sense, denotes a kind of making manifest,
a letting something be seen from that which is at issue, that which the
discourse is about.
(2) Logos as language (Sprache)
Now when Logos as Rede is 'brought to voice', is expressed
phonetically, it becomes language in the sense of a 'vocal pronunciation
in words'.
Note that this single description involves a derivation from the more fundamental
sense of Logos as a 'making manifest.'
(3) Logos as synthesis
Because Logos has the fundamental meaning of a 'making manifest', of a 'letting
something be seen', that is to say, because Logos involves what the Greeks
called "synthesis" -- it can have the structural form of synthesis.
(a) not in the sense of a 'tying together' of discreet sense
data i.e. a binding together of representations (ex. the perceptual 'synthesis'
involved in walking around a table) [this involves a mental (psychical)
manipulation which itself is questionable] but rather,
(b) in the "apophantical" sense of letting something be seen in
its togetherness with something (as when we say 'the table is in the corner
of the room': "synthesizing" 'the table' with 'the corner' or
'the picture on the wall is crooked.' Here we let the table be seen in its
togetherness with the corner -- this is the sense of the "synthesis."
Synthesis 'makes something manifest' in its togetherness.
(4) Logos as Being-true or Being-false
Truth, as Heidegger will try to understand it in Sec. 44, has its
primordial meaning in the Greek sense of aletheia i.e., uncoveredness
or unconcealment.
With this in mind, he writes: the 'Being-true' of Logos means that
in Logos as making manifest the beings (Seiende) of which
one is talking are somehow taken out of hiddeness. They are let
seen as unhidden i.e., they are uncovered.
Thus the being-true of Logos involves the notion of uncoveredness and from
this it follows that being-false involves some kind of covering up or concealment.
Note that the primordial 'locus' of truth will be, for Heidegger, in the
notion of alhqeia (uncoveredness) and not in the sense of Logos as 'letting
something be seen.'
Only through a modification in this structure can it come about that 'truth'
will have its 'locus' in a kind Logos.
Such a modification comes about when Logos acquires a synthesis structure
and becomes spoken about in terms of judgment (Urteil).
Then and only then will we have truth or falsity spoken about in terms of
judgments and statements. As when the 'synthesis' of 'table' and 'corner'
become expressed in the statement (logos) 'the table is in the corner of
the room' If the table is there, the statement (logos) 'is true', if not,
the statement 'is false.'
For Heidegger, this whole attempt to locate truth in judgment misses the
primordial sense of both Logos and aletheia (We will see
precisely how this is so in Section 44)
Summing up--the discussion of Logos indicates, in a preliminary way, the
primary sense of the term for Heidegger--Logos means: a letting something
be seen (Schenlassen), a 'kind of making manifest.'
Copyright: Robert Cavalier at rc2z@andrew.cmu.edu
Department of Philosophy / Carnegie Mellon University