(1) Emphasis on general theoretical moral principles and the belief that an algorithmic application of those principles to each and every 'species' of moral action is possible has distorted both our sense of ethics and our ability to deal convincingly with difficult moral choices;

(2) Recognition that (a) there exists a clear and unambiguous set of moral paradigms (prima facie duties) and that (b) there also exits a host of historically contingent cases in which such paradigms come into conflict or are marginally and ambiguously applicable provides a venue for avoiding the dual trappings of moral absolutism and ethical relativism.

(3) A reflection upon the tradition of "casuistry" and its background sources in the ethics of Aristotle and the rhetoric of Cicero can stimulate a fresh approach to both contemporary moral philosophy and present day discussions in applied ethics.

The methods of a modern day casuistry rely on the notion that practical reason moves forward through its confrontation with difficult cases. Practical arguments "draw on the outcomes of previous experience, carrying over the procedures used to resolve earlier problems and reapplying them in new problematic situations ... the facts of the present case define the grounds on which any resolution must be based; the general considerations that carried weight in similar situations provide the warrants that help settle future cases...[and] so the resolution of any problem holds good presumptively; its strength depends on the similarities between the present case and the precedents; and its soundness can be challenged in situations that are recognized as exceptional" (AC p. 35).

As with clinical medicine, the approach to specific moral cases requires a working knowledge of 'taxonomies' from which one can draw analogies to set paradigm cases. This constitutes part of the practical wisdom necessary to deal with particular individuals and specific circumstances.

It is also necessary to recognize those situations that evoke reasoned disagreement over the applicability of paradigm solutions. At these margins, Cavalier suggests that we fall back upon the pragmatic requirements of social intelligence (Dewey) and the concomitant need to listen to all sides (Hampshire) and to 'muddle through' (Putnam) as best we can under the conditions of an open and informed conversation (Habermas, Rorty).

At points in that conversation, we will need 'thick descriptions' of the people and circumstances being discussed. We need these adjuncts to the crucibles of experience (Covey) in order to bring about the kind of phronesis and sympathetic participation necessary to truly engage in informed conversations about the issues and principles involved.

These data rich descriptions also provide access to the detailed circumstances that surround difficult cases. The questio of general issues is balanced, in the real world, by the causa of specifics. Attention to Ciceronian circumstantia casts light on the substance of controversy -- and it is through these details that difficult cases must be viewed and discussed.

Now there is certainly a place in the conversation for foundational theories to be evoked in an attempt to provide a reasoned 'sway' in the resolution of the problem. Here the words "Rawls" or "Engelhardt" or "Beauchamp & Childress" can represent a theory that bides for relevance and rhetorical force in the particular debate over a course of action or an administrative policy. Moral theories, in this sense, are not mutually exclusive sets of principles or procedures, but frameworks for understanding a particular situation and opportunities for creating a general consensus. They become elements within the larger movement of conflict resolution and historical change. Theories 'touch the world' when they become useful in conversations concerning difficult cases.