Meta-Ethics.6.1: Antje Gimmler Mon, 14 Oct 1996 12:47:14 EDT (71 lines)
Antje Gimmler has provided us with an excellent overview of Habermas's discourse ethics.
At the conclusion of her overview, Dr. Gimmler raises the following questions: One of the main problems concerning the Habermasian discourse ethics that emerges from this - very short - presentation is, whether he succeeds in his important conjunction of claims capable of justification by universalization, on the one hand, with, on the other hand, those particular contexts where the claims are generated and are going to be applied. a) The contextual embeddedness of moral theory (and with it, of a pragmatic form of moral argument) is approached by Habermas when he critiques Karl-Otto Apel's effort to establish a "final foundation" [Letztbegruendung] via transcendental argumentation. Habermas points out quite rightly that the fact that in disputing the validity claims of truth, normative rightness and authenticity [Wahrhaftigkeit], we must nonetheless apply precisely these norms to our dispute - this does not entail any foundation, much less a final foundation for these validity claims. This could be interpreted as a transcendental-logical mistake by K.-O. Apel. For Habermas, however, this shows only that we actually have no alternatives in argument. The validity claims are 'pragmatic universals'. His critique of Apel does not imply that the validity claims are not valid. b) The separation of questions of justice (that, as moral (and legal) questions are, suitable questions for practical discourse) from those questions concerning individual ways of life is based on the presupposition that only intersubjective conflicts are relevant for morality. For Habermas, the process of self-understanding and self-determination [Selbstverstaendigung] of subjects in choosing their way of life is not a issue for moral theory. But it is in fact a point in question as to whether just here are connections that are difficult for a moral theory to avoid. From Habermas's point of view, subjects' plans for their individual ways of life and their self-conceptions are connected with moral theory not only through possible conflicts but through the intersubjectivity of the process of establishing one's identity and and sense of self. Habermas recognizes that conditions of the lifeworld must cooperate with moral theory if they are to allow us be a moral subjects at all. And so he criticizes all 'individualistic reductions' of morality, such as Rational Choice theory. But Habermas also decisively abandons the notion that morality relies upon a shared, substantial consensus. Communitarian thinkers such as Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor have been considering in what respect this could diminish, however, willingness to participate in practical discourse and to perform the perspective-taking required by discourse ethics. One way to enable autonomous subjects' self-understanding and self-determination is the democracy model of civil society in Between Facts and Norms. The formality of discourse ethics is consistently continued here in Habermas's theory of political order. c) Habermas thinks of the principle of discourse and the image of the ideal discourse as criteria for selecting in a negative way. This is one ground of the fallibilism to which discourse ethics lays claim. But because Habermas himself is considering the institutionalization of discourses - criteria for a negative selection aren't sufficient. There is a need for developing positive criteria for making those institutions possible. And here is - from my point of view - the greatest potential of the discourse ethics. As shown in the so-called mediation procedure [Mediationsverfahren] the principles of discourse can be applied in the form of argumentation rules for finding solutions for limited domains, for concrete questions and for different interests. The discourse ethics is not a ethics that gives norms for every moral conflict that might arise, for example in biotechnology, etc. But the discourse ethics is effective in providing tools for a communicative framework in which political and moral conflicts are resolved.
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