Meta-Ethics.2.1: Ross Poole Mon, 30 Sep 1996 10:48:39 EDT (95 lines)
By Ross Poole
Let me begin with a general background to my position. Detail & support (and complication) can come later as necessary. When we advance moral considerations to others (or to ourselves) we assume (1) that they have a certain objectivity, i.e. they are not merely the expressions of individual interest or desire (`I want you to do this . . .'); (2) that they have a certain purchase on our motives; that all things being equal, they provide reasons for the other (or ourselves) to act in one way rather than another. Context is important. A group may be constituted around a common interest or commitment. Within that group, this will provide all the objectivity and reason giving that is necessary. The group morality will consist of the working out of the common interest and commitment. Sometimes membership of a group is constitutive of one's identity. What one ought to do is not so much a matter of what one wants to do or has committed oneself to do; it is a matter of giving expression to that identity. Insofar as the identity is non-reflective, the force of morality will be something like the force of nature. For many of us, family commitments are something like this. Not to respond to family commitments (responsibilities to children) is not merely not doing what one ought; but is a failure at a deeper level. Western modernity is corrosive of taken for granted identities of this kind. For many reasons. One of these is cultural diversity: we are confronted and must interact with others from different cultural backgrounds. This both makes us aware of the contingency of our own given identities (some measure of reflectiveness is inescapable) and the limitations of the moral perspective which expresses those identities. We are in the sphere of morality (how ought we to act to others), but have left behind one of its sources. What kinds of moral considerations can we bring into play in this context? And can they satisfy requirements (1) and (2) above? The major difficulty of meeting this challenge is presented by fact that once we leave behind us the comfortable group commitments and taken for granted identities, we enter a conceptual space dominated by models of objectivity and rationality which are inimical to the enterprise of morality: (A) For many (e.g. Mackie) objectivity means being part of the fabric of the (physical) world. In itself this is not necessarily problematic, but it becomes so when we assume also a certain model of knowledge, based on the paradigms of the natural sciences. Knowledge in this sense cannot and will not find `values' in the objective world (this is what Weber meant by `disenchantment'). An objective morality becomes impossible. (B) For many (e.g. rational choice theorists) having a reason to act in a certain way is closely associated with this action being a means to already given ends. But then the reason giving character of moral considerations has to justified in a situation where we cannot assume any common ends. Clearly, there are many ways of meeting these problems. My own suggestion with regard to (A) is that we resist the hegemony of naturalism (Taylor in Sources of the Self has good things to say about this). We need to work with hermeneutic models of knowledge which have a place for objectivity, but to do not destroy value. With regard to (B) the situation is even more complex. The most influential move is to adopt some form of Kantianism, i.e. the discovery of a form of reason (`reasonableness', `communicative reason') which is not that of instrumental reason. While I think there is a lot in this (especially the Habermasian version), I worry (I) whether it has sufficient content to give us what we want from a social morality (Hegel's criticism of Kant), and (ii) whether it provides us with a `reason to do one thing rather than another' (i.e. (2) above). My own way forward is a quasi-Aristotelian one: we need to locate the content of a social morality in terms of a theory of the good life. But the theory of the good life will not be a narrowly focussed one: it will develop themes of J S Mill and others, according to which the presence of diversity (i.e. different ways of life, commitments is a necessary constituent of the good life). And the way in which the reason giving character of morality is related to this conception of the good life will not be that of means to end, but as a element in the idea of narrative unity or coherence. It will be clear from all this, that my approach to meta-ethics leads very quickly to questions of moral theory.
Meta-Ethics.2.2: Fred D'Agostino
Thu, 03 Oct 1996 07:35:06 EDT (23 lines)
Of course, contemporary 'liberal' meta-ethics, as in Rawls, begins where Ross Poole's neo-Aristotelianism seems to leave off. Where Ross invokes the ideal of 'the good life', Rawls and others invoke the multiplicity of this very ideal. When things are unpacked, especially in a modern setting characterized by the division of labor and ethnic, religious, and ethical pluralism, there is no single or umabiguous ideal of 'the good life' (that can be sustained in a non- authoritarian way). To be sure, the point is familiar enough so that Ross probably has a reply to it. I would be interested to see what it is!
Meta-Ethics.2.3: Charles Ess
Thu, 03 Oct 1996 14:11:41 EDT (161 lines)
Some questions from the standpoint of someone more rooted in Kant and Habermas than in Aristotle (though not opposed to Aristotle)....
1) In discussing the context of moral considerations, Ross Poole notes: Within that group, this will provide all the objectivity and reason giving that is necessary. But is this what we mean necessarily by "objectivity" and "reason"? In particular, if they are understood as entities whose scope is restricted to the boundaries of a specific group - these strike me as relatively impoverished notions of "objectivity" and "reason." As is well- known, both the more characteristic Enlightenment notion of reason (Newton, Kant, etc.) and the "postmetaphysical" reformulations of reason in Habermas's project involve notions that stress precisely the putative ability of reason to discern truths (physical and moral) that are "objective," - i.e., which are valid beyond the boundaries of a given group and its worldview. I have two questions here: 1) is there a danger of question-begging if we accept this initial characterization of objectivity and reason, and 2) this characterization seems to further point strongly to relativism in general, accompanied by the particular problem: if "objectivity" and "reason" are valid only within the framework of a given group - then there is no possibility of, say, democrats condemning fascists as immoral, those opposed to genocide condemning those who practice it as immoral, etc. Perhaps Ross Poole has a way of avoid such relativism and its consequences? Or are relativism and such consequences not of concern in his viewpoint? 2) Ross Poole asserts that Western modernity is corrosive of taken for granted identities of this kind. For many reasons. One of these is cultural diversity... I think more needs to be said here. While there is little question that what Ross Poole calls granted identities are under stress in the contemporary world - I'm very uneasy with the notion that "Western modernity" is, without further (and complicated) qualification, the culprit. This is in part because I find that "Western modernity" is a pretty complicated and multi-faceted beast. Once we turn up the magnification and begin to examine particular thinkers, various elements of cultural life, etc. - "Western modernity" quickly disappears into an extensive and complex swirl of fine details which often contradict one another and frustrate any effort at broad generalization. Given this, I find that "Western modernity," especially as characterized by postmodernists and philosophers out of more analytic orientations (i.e., ones characteristically hostile to more historical and continental orientations), becomes a straw man. I would quickly add that Ross Poole is admirable here for playing by the rules - i.e., by keeping this experimental post short - and that such brevity forces one into a broad and general discourse which obscures one's more fine-grained understanding of things. So let me repeat: I think more needs to be said here - in part, just so as to avoid oversimplication and straw man. 3) Ross Poole continues: ...once we leave behind us the comfortable group commitments and taken for granted identities, we enter a conceptual space dominated by models of objectivity and rationality which are inimical to the enterprise of morality: His examples make sense - but I wonder if there's a false dilemma at work beneath the surface here? Namely, an either/or between "objectivity" (especially as assumed within the natural sciences, the social sciences, etc. - but which may neither hold up to close examination from within the philosophy of science, nor reflect more than the influence of 19th ct. positivism on what many 20th ct. folk think "objectivity" must mean) and "subjectivity"? Generally, it seems to me that this either/or was disposed of by Kant's "Copernican Revolution" in epistemology, one which points to a middle ground that conjoins both (from the pre-Kantian standpoint) "objective" and "subjective" elements. This false dilemma - and the positivist undergirding of it - seem to me clearly at work when Ross Poole claims that "An objective morality becomes impossible" (given that "objectivity" can reside only in the physical world). Am I being overly critical here? Or missing something that would obviate this concern? 4) Finally, Ross Poole acknowledges the power of a Habermasian response to these problems - but worries i) whether it has sufficient content to give us what we want from a social morality (Hegel's criticism of Kant), and (ii) whether it provides us with a `reason to do one thing rather than another' I think these are important worries, and I'm grateful that Ross Poole has raised them. A comment on each, however: i) how trenchent is Hegel's criticism of Kant - given that Habermas has, in his own view at least, reformulated a Kantian/Enlightenment conception of reason which Habermas takes to be "postmetaphysical"? My question is - does Hegel's critique of Kant, in light of Habermas's reformulation, apply so directly to Habermas? ii) Habermas himself has raised the question as to whether ethics can provide us with a reason to do things - in at least one sense. In his 1991 (German)/1993 (English) essay, "To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning Without God Is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer," Habermas writes:...even today philosophy can explicate the moral point of view from which we can judge something impartially as just or unjust; to this extent, communicative reason is by no means equally indifferent to morality and immorality. However, it is altogether a different matter to provide a motivating response to the question of why we should follow our moral insights or why we should be moral at all. In _this_ respect, it may perhaps be said that to seek to salvage an unconditional meaning without God is a futile undertaking, for it belongs to the peculiar dignity of philosophy to maintain adamantly that no validity claim can be cognitive import unless it is vindicated before the tribunal of justifcatory discourse. (_Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, Ciaran P. Cronin, trans. [MIT Press, 1993], 146)What I take this to mean is that philosophy, even in our postmetaphysical times, can still achieve at least a close approximation of its goal of providing a reasonably objective moral system (one that takes into account cultural relativism without slipping into ethical relativism, for example). But the articulation of an adequate moral system may not be sufficient reason (my words) for doing the right thing (though it may be a necessary condition?). Rather, what Habermas seems to open the door to here is the problem Ross Poole has raised above - the problem of motive. And he seems to be suggesting that religion may in fact play a crucial role in morality, insofar as it may offer the motive for doing the right thing, where the right thing is articulated in the rational terms of philosophical ethics. This is a pretty stunning point in Habermas's work, for obvious reasons. I raise it here primarily as a way of pointing out that the question of motive that Ross Poole points to in "ii)" above as a possible problem for Habermas is a problem that Habermas is aware of - and his response to it seems still very much "under construction." None of this is meant to take away from Ross Poole's own "quasi- Aristotelian project. On the contrary, I'll be interested to see how he unfolds it in this context. In particular, I'll be interested in seeing how its turn to"the idea of narrative unity or coherence" as an alternative to a mean/end structure for motive/reason-giving will contrast with responses to the question of motive/reason-giving from within Habermasian and other related frameworks. Cordially - Charles Ess
Meta-Ethics.2.4: Ross Poole (rpoole) Tue, 08 Oct 1996 23:03:30 EDT (76
lines) Responses by Ross Poole Sorry to have been so long replying; I have been away & incommunicado. Thanks to both Fred & Charles for thoughtful criticisms. Response to Fred D'Agostino: Two comments: (1) A conception of the good life will be normative. That is to say it will not claim there is/will be convergence on this conception in actual or likely circumstances. It is rather that to claim that there are good reasons for this conception, therefore good reasons to recommend & advocate it, and to hope that in not impossible circumstances most people might most of the time come to accept it. (2) The conception will itself be pluralist. We can derive from Mill the idea that diversity is itself an ingredient in the good life, in that it is required (a) for autonomy and (b) for meaningful choice & commitment. So toleration will be a good, not a modus vivendi (i.e. we tolerate because we are not yet in a position to persuade or coerce; rather we tolerate because we recognise that the existence of diversity makes our life better). This account will be liberal, but not in the preferred post-Rawlsian (& Habermasian) sense). The good (which will include the positive affirmation of diversity) will be prior to the right (the just). What hangs on this? My belief that unless we locate a theory of justice within a conception of the good, we will not be able to provide reasons why we should be just. The question of authoritarianism is a red herring. If autonomy is a component in the good life, then I will have good reasons not to impose my conception of the good on others - unless, of course, they are interfering with the conditions of autonomy in others. I think that liberals are too much under the sway of Rawls here. In Theory of Justice he implied that questions of good were subjective; later he retreats from this to the claim that they are inevitably controversial. True enough. But so too is any substantive question in moral philosophy - including Rawls' own views on justice (and they are not the worse for that). Response to Charles Ess I think that some of Charles' comments are directed at scene setting remarks, rather than at positions I actually hold. For example, Charles' (3) is directed at a position I explicitly attribute to `many (e.g. Mackie)'; I go on to say that we should `resist the hegemony of naturalism.' Then, we can begin to make sense of the idea that there are objective values. My idea is that with a hermeneutic understanding of the social world we can understand it `objectively', as containing values which are (relevantly) reason giving. But I cannot claim to have spelled this out (here or anywhere else!) I guess that my remark about `Western modernity' was glib. But hardly controversial. And I really do not accept the idea that `Western modernity disappears into an extensive and complex swirl of fine detail . . . ` What about capitalism, the market, rationalisation, the separation of value spheres, etc. etc.? Generalisation may be difficult, but not impossible, especially if we are prepared to critically use Marx, Weber, even Habermas, etc. Thanks for the Habermas reference: I had not read that essay before. The last passage brings out very clearly the distinction Habermas draws between objective valdity and (`altogether a different matter') questions of motivation. But the link I muh closer and more important than H recognises: it exists through the idea of moral considerations providing reasons for action. What must be true for this to be the case? One necessary (certainly not sufficient) move: reject the idea that a reason for action must locate a means to a distinct end; replace it with the idea of helping make sense of life (or some aspect of it), where making sense is explained in terms of narrative coherence. This provides a place for teleology, even where we are not able to articulate a final goal. (I say a bit more about these ideas in `Living with reason,' Inquiry 1992; obviously I am influenced by MacIntyre here.)
Meta-Ethics.2.5: Fred D'Agostino (fdagosti) Mon, 14 Oct 1996 01:58:39 EDT (99 lines)
Good on ya, Ross; this is a very 'Australian' (not a typo for 'Aristotelian') conception of ethico-political reasoning.
The parts I like are the 'objective' basis for toleration and, the same thing really?, the plurality or diversity of the notion of the good.
There are some parts that I will need to see more about before I know whether to like them or not.
Does the idea that "unless we locate a theory of justice within a conception of the good, we will not be able to provide reasons why we should be just" presuppose some teleological conception of reason; i.e. that, the right is the advancement of the good? If so, does this mean that we will, where the good is plural, have indeterminacy about the right? (Of course, I can't COMPLAIN if it does mean that, since I am stuck with plurality about the right myself.)
Also: why should 'advances the good' be the schema for 'is a reason for'? What about deontological reasoning—viz. I have a reason to X because I am committed to some principle *, which implies that I should X? There may be—indeed I think there are—grave difficulties identifying principles that would sustain such an argument, but the idea that there MIGHT be some doesn't seem unintelligible. Does your approach imply that they are?
One point of clarification. For me—though not, I agree, for Rawls—the point isn't so much that conceptions of the good are inevitably controversial. It is, rather, that any proposal to 'establish' A conception of the good (in preference to others) is an attempt to REDUCE an INTRINSIC and objective diversity of conceptions.
Of course, perhaps this doesn't fit with your model. Perhaps your model is of A conception of the good that itself INCORPORATES diversity. This seems the likelier interpretation, but I leave it to you to say whether it is the right one.
However, on EITHER model, we seem to have that what it is right to do, what justice requires, may be indeterminate—and, on either model, not because of the 'burdens of reason'.
On my model, we have this because there is, objectively a plurality of conceptions of the good AND a plurality of conception of reason.
On your model, we seem to have this because THE conception of the good is internally complex...and because the right/the just is (teleologically) defined in terms of this internally complex conception of the good.
It seems that, aside from autonomy and tolerance, we are back to square one as far as SUBSTANTIVE ethico- political principles are concerned. Depending on how 'often' this diversity is encountered in our reasoning, there may be little of substance that can be asserted 'normatively' (i.e. in a way binding on all, from the point of view of reason).
Meta-Ethics.2.6: Ross Poole (rpoole) Fri, 18 Oct 1996 03:43:29 EDT (91 lines)
Response to Fred d'Agostino
On conceptions of the good. Even on my view there will be irreducible differences between valued ways of life. These will be analogous to the irreducible differences, e.g., between those who like Wagner and those who go for Bach, or between devotees of classical music and philosophers, or . . .But I want to argue that people also ought to value the social diversity and otherness which allows their chosen way of life as one amongst others. So instead of allowing that there is an irreducible diversity in conceptions of the good, I argue for a unitary conception of the good which includes diversity as a value (In Fred's language, an `internally complex' conception of the good).
What hangs on this? A consequence of this view is that social diversity is not simply a fact that we (and others) have to learn to live with, but something we ought to value as a constituent of the good life. Toleration is not the bare acceptance of others (faut de mieux), but a liberal virtue consitutive of a good life. It proposes that a liberal society is one characterised by diversity but which is organized around a conception of the good, i.e. the good of diversity.
It is also a consequence of this view that there are limits to the extent to which a liberal society can recognise intolerant minorities (which does not mean that a liberal society has the right to suppress them).
I think of this as a Millian form of liberalism as it builds on some elements of `On Liberty' (while ignoring others). I think of it as quasi-Aristotliean because it would need to say a lot about the virtues (tolerance, civilility, etc.) Required by social life in a diverse society and also partilaly constitutive of the good life for members of such a society.
Thee are many problems with this kind of view. For example, there are those who think it is incompatible with deep commitments, i.e those ways of life to which we are so committed that we cannot but think that other ways of life are inferior (difference in philosophy is ofen like this). As far as I can see, the only place in a liberal society for commitments such as these is in the private realm (as religion has been uncomfortably confined) or as shared public values (e.g. national identity). The importance of the latter places certain constraints on the diversity which is possible (limits on multiculturalism).
When I claimed that we can only have reasons to do something (e.g. be just) if we locate it within a conception of the good. I did not quite mean by this that we can only have reasons for an action if it `advances, the good. At least not of this is understood as a causal means to a disitnct end. There are too many free rider cases for it to be plausible to suppose that justice will always causally advance the good. It is rather that it must in general contribute to the good, and also a constitutent of the good life of the good life for individuals. Roughly: acting justly will in general be conducive to sustaining a decent society; the members of the society must conceive their own well being in such a way that acting justly is part of it. One has reason to be just because is is a consitutent in a conception of the good life with which one ought to identify.
The framework here is weakly telological. It is not plausible to suppose that we have or might have clearly conceived goals, and that achieving these goals is the good life for us. It is more plausible to suppose that we have - or should have - the goal of making sense of our lives, and that we have reason to act in certain ways which contributes to this. I want to explicate `making sense' in terms of achieving narrative unity. I have said a little bit about this in my Inquiry article in 1992, but not nearly enough. MacIntyre & Ricoeur are sources here.
Lying behind this is the assumption that reasons are always `internal' in something like Bernard Williams' sense (I have not got the source handy, so I hope I get this right). In other words, for something to be a reason it will be so relative to desires that I have or should have. That is why I do not think that principles as such provide reasons. But the nature of the relativity to desires is complex, and is not exhausted by the means/end relation. Again, the idea of contributing to making sense of a life plays a role here.
Even on the most flexible reasons of the reasons for action, it will not be the case that moral considerations always provide reasons for action. An oppressor may benefit so much from a situation that certain moral considerations have no purchase on his/her motives. Then, the `force of arms must replace the force of argument' (Marx somewhere or other). This bears on other issues in this forum. In this context it is sufficient to say that it involves a denial of the (Kantian) idea that moral considerations will always count as reasons (for all rational beings).
Cheers
Ross
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