THE SOPHIST

Prologue (216a-218d)

On the day after the discussion which took place in the Theaetetus, Theodorus, Theaetetus, and Socrates have met again, and are joined this time by a "stranger from Elea" and a youth with Socrates' namesake. The stranger is a member of the school of Parmenides, and hence one who is devoted to philosophy (and presumably sympathetic to the Parmenidean thesis that the Real is the Permanent and the Unchanging).

Socrates asks this stranger if the people of Elea draw a distinction between Sophists, Statesmen, and Philosophers. The stranger responds positively, and, with a little prodding, he is induced to discuss these distinctions. He will begin with the first term -- the Sophist.

With this, the dialogue has found its topic. Furthermore, it is decided that the main participants shall be the stranger from Elea and the young Theaetetus. Together, they set out to define the nature of the Sophist...

[We should note how this problem of the Sophist connects with and continues the problem of knowledge in the Theaetetus. The Sophist is a person who can "deceive" through the use of artful language. That is to say, the Sophist is capable of making things appear true when they are false and false when they are true. The problem of the Sophist is thus bound up with the problems of truth and falsity. But the problems of the True and the False belong most properly with the problem of knowledge. It is for this reason that the dialogue of the Sophist continues on the path of knowledge.]

The task that the dialogue has set for itself is to search out a "species" called the Sophist. Already the stranger is clear that the kind of enquiry before them is not one that will involve a search for a particular person, but a search for the Form of Sophistry itself (218c). In this manner, the dialogue has already moved beyond the initial confusion of the Theaetetus. It is already further along on the path of knowledge.

In order to disclose the Form of Sophistry, the stranger proposes a method (218d) which the others had lacked on the previous day. This method involves a type of "collecting and dividing" which is capable of uncovering the nature of things. (It is a method which, when employed in a purely philosophical enquiry, will be called dialectic.) To help Theaetetus understand this method, and to prepare him for the real search, the stranger proposes that they begin with a simple, but analogous, problem (218d-e).

He uses as his example the Angler, and he employs the method of dialectic as the way of uncovering the nature, or essence, of this angler. The stranger begins by "collecting" the angler under the general category of a person who possesses an art. He then "divides" the angler according to his specific art. We are led through this division to see that the angler is one who has mastered the art of acquiring things by capturing them through hunting. Schematically, Plato presents us with the following picture (219a-221a):

Art

Acquisitive (e.g., buying and selling, hunting)

by Exchange

by Capture

(conquest)

Open Force (fighting)

(e.g., the art of the warrior)

Secret Force (hunting)

of animals

of fish

(the Angler)

Productive

(e.g., agriculture, vessel-making)

In this manner we have "captured" the angler by collecting him the genus of art, and by dividing that genus in such a way as to yield his specific "form" viz., a hunter of fish who acquires them by capture. The stranger has also given Theaetetus an example of the method of definition by dialectic (i.e., collection and division) (221a).

We will now use this method to hunt for a definition of the Sophist. Since both the angler and the Sophist practice an art of some sort, our search for the Sophist will begin in an analogous manner. Yet the Sophist is a much more complex creature, and his art seems to expand into many diverse areas.

The Sophist is described as one who travels from town to town in search of young men to instruct. He teaches them, for a fee, the art of debate (i.e., he teaches them how to "make the weaker argument appear stronger"). Furthermore, this art of debate enables the Sophist to appear wise in all matters, since he is skilled at debating any position, and defending it or refuting it. His topics range from the politics of the state to the virtues of the individual. Indeed, on account of this art, some Sophists claim to be able to impart, not only the art of debate, but the principles of virtue to which they subscribe.

The description of the Sophist thus looms large as a multifarious creature: master of argument, teacher of virtue, and wise man in all matters. Yet, at bottom, he is a most problematical creature, since his Art of debate merely allow him to appear to be a wise teacher and knower of all things. The Sophist is ultimately one who dwells in the realm of semblance and deception.

To prove this to the young Theaetetus, the stranger analyzes the nature of the Sophist through dialectic. The discussion yields the following, more complex, diagram:

Art [The Art of Sophistry]

Acquisitive

by Exchange

(223c-224e)

II The Sophist as Retailer and Merchant

by

Capture

Secret Force

(Hunting)

(221d-223b)

fish

(Angler)

animals

non-human

human

I The Sophist as hunter of rich young men

Open Force

(Fighting)

(225a-226a)

violent

bodily

contact

competition amongst souls

public controversy

private

disagreements

babbler

III The Sophist as

an artist of debate

Productive

Divine

Human

of

originals

of images

(232a-256c)

IV The Sophist

as imagemaker

These divisions* can be divided as follows:

I The Sophist is one who uses secret force (viz., the act of persuasion) to capture rich young men.

II The Sophist, like the merchant, goes from town to town selling his manufactured knowledge (especially the knowledge of virtue). He sells this as "food for the soul" to those who are able to pay for it.

III The Sophist is a skilled debater who teaches others this art for a fee.

IV The Sophist appears wise in all matters. This is due to the fact that his art of debate and controversy enables him to produce an image of a semblance of wisdom, while he himself remains devoid of any real wisdom. The Sophist is an image-maker and deceiver.

Thus, simplified, our initial diagram looks like this:

The Sophist

Hunter of young men|

Seller of virtue

Skilled debater

Deceiver

*I omit the division concerning the art of "separation" (226b-231b), since the stranger rightfully hesitates to call this area "sophistry." This section is really Plato's description of the cathartic art of the historical Socrates, which seems like the art of Sophistry but which is really the first stage on the road to Philosophy.

I The Worlds of Reality and Appearance (237a-251a)

The problem of "Reality" is an ancient one, and will require a collecting of previous opinions before it can be satisfactorily resolved. The stranger ~_~ - A Real (i.e., the problem of Being) with the Parmenidean problem of Non-being: "Never shall this be proved--that things that ' are not' are" (237a). In the strict sense, the stranger says, this statement is perhaps true. It does not seem possible for a person to speak of that which "is not," if we take this Non-being to be something that is totally unreal. Language, by necessity, requires numerical notions such as "unity" or "plurality" in order for us to use references such as "it" (a single unit) or "them" (a plurality).

Yet if something (sic.) were totally unreal, then we could not possibly speak of it, it would indeed be something unthinkable (238b-c).

So it appears, at first glance, that it is not possible for us to speak about something that "is not." Yet this realm of Non-being seems to be the very home of the Sophist. He is a creature who dwells in the ethers of Appearance and Falsehood. In order to discuss this matter further, the stranger must move beyond the trivial truth contained in Parmenides' statement, and into a deeper understanding of this "non- being," and its relation to Appearance and Reality.

We have characterized the Sophist as an image-maker. What, more precisely, does this mean? Perhaps if we understood the nature of an image (eidolon), we would also come closer to understanding the nature of appearance and reality. An image, after all, bears a certain "likeness" to the real object of which it is an image (viz., the painting of a tree to the tree itself). Yet the image is not real in the sense in which the actual object is real. Thus, while the image is not wholly unreal (we have, for instance, the semblance of a tree), it in nevertheless. not wholly real (it is not itself an actual tree). The image thus exists somewhere in between that which is real and the Parmenidean abyss of the "totally unreal." There is, then, a sense in which that which "is not" (the image of the tree is not the tree itself) in some respect "is" (the image exists nevertheless as an image) (241d).

This discussion of the image also allows the stranger to re-introduce the problems of appearance and falsehood. For a false statement can appear in the same manner: It states that things that are not "are," and, conversely, that things that are "are not" (240e).

The stranger's analysis of the nature of an image has therefore provided us with a way of passing through this Parmenidean paradox. Whatever they might ultimately be, appearance and falsehood are no longer to be seen as merely pseudo-problems. With this initial barrier overcome, the stranger now proposes that he and Theaetetus continue the journey by "taking first things first" i.e., that he and Theaetetus go back to the problem of Reality (242b-c).

While this "new start" remains implicitly guided by the dialogue's attempt to arrive at a full disclosure of the Sophist as an image-maker and deceiver, its manifest goal will be to disclose the full nature of Reality as a whole. Such a disclosure, however, would have as one of its tasks the purpose of bringing to light the manner in which appearance and falsehood can arise as a possibility (for if Sophistry is to "exist," then Reality as a whole must contain within itself the possibility of illusion). The upcoming discussion of "Reality" will thus set out the grounds for distinguishing the true (the real) from the false (the apparent), and, in so doing, it will lay the foundation for a theory of knowledge. As such, the following analysis is of extreme importance. The stranger will proceed through three basic stages: (1) A review of the ancient ("Materialistic") descriptions of Reality, (2) a discussion of Parmenides' ("Idealistic") description of Reality, and (3) a synthesis of the Materialists' and Idealists' views of Reality, with a view toward Plato's own conception of Reality.

(1) The ancient mythological interpretations of the Cosmos (242c-243e).

In the beginning, the stranger says, the Cosmos was often described in terms of an interplay of forces. For example, from the interplay and strife arising from the forces of Hot and Cold, all things are brought forth. "Reality," on this account, becomes the result of this interplay between "Hot" and "Cold." Indeed, "Reality" is nothing else but the interplay of "Hot" and "Cold." (It is in this sense that these early theories lay the groundwork for the principle of materialism insofar as they seek to explain the Real in terms of its "material" elements e.g., Hot and Cold.) But the stranger feels uncomfortable with this attempt to reduce one term (viz., the Real) to other and different terms. How can the real (Greek: to on) be the Hot and Cold? It is, rather, a third term--for clearly it has a meaning that is separate from the meaning of Hot and Cold. Yet the more one looks at this term "Reality" (or "Being"), the more perplexing it appears to become (244a). The stranger thus suggests that they look for other descriptions of the Real.

(2) The Parmenidean conception of the One Real Being (244b-245d).

Unlike the early cosmologists, Parmenides did not seek to define Reality in terms of different elements and opposing forces. He sought to overcome the previous problem, not by trying to explain one term (Reality) in other terms (Hot/Cold), but by boldly stating that All is One. Reality "is" only as One Real Being.

But the same problem of name-reference seems to accompany the Parmenidean perspective. The nature of this "One Real Being," by its very statement, implies at least two names (viz., "One" and "Real"). Parmenides' attempt to speak of Reality as One Real Being implicitly appeals to the "Forms" of Unity and Existence. The apparent Whole that Parmenides sought seems to consist of parts. The problem of Reality remains (244c- 245c).

Secondly, the Parmenidean description of Reality as One Being lacks the need to account for the notions of plurality and change. His "Changeless Unity" neglects that aspect of wholeness which seems necessary to accomodate (a) the existence of many different things (plurality) and (b) the manifest growth and coming-into-being (change) that is evident throughout the cosmos (245d-e). Parmenides seems to give us a kind of "Idealism" which describes a reality beyond the realm of the empirical. The Parmenidean principle cannot account for the (Heraclitean) world of Becoming. Yet any adequate description of Reality must include this changing and complex world of our sense experience...

The first attempts to define "Reality" have ended in failure. Neither the attempt to explain Reality in terms of its elements nor the attempt to explain Reality as an undivided unity has achieved, on its own, an adequate description. Both positions must yield a little before they can approach the truth of the matter. This is the purpose of the upcoming "battle" between the Giants and the Friends of the Forms. Plato will expand these positions, and then, through a synthesis, he will bring them together in order to present his own conception of Reality.

(3)The battle of the Giants (the Materialists) and the Friends of the Forms (the Idealists) (245e-250e).

The giants are a motley crew who only see and understand those things that can be handled and kicked about. To them, the "Real" is always some body or another. For Plato, these giants come to represent the principle of materialism in its most radical stage: The Real must be restricted to the empirical, that is, to the objects of sensation (246b).

At first, these giants are placed in opposition to the gods, who come to represent an early stage in the theory of the Forms. These divine beings place the Real in an intelligible realm of changless, bodiless Forms. They see the giants as dwelling in an ephemeral world of illusionary Becoming, a world which only "appears" Real but which lacks all Reality (246c).

The initial battleline is thus drawn between the two camps. On the one hand, we have the forces of complete materialism and, on the other hand, the proponents of Ideal, Changeless Forms. As the battle progresses, however, each side will modify its position.

The materialists must be brought to see that there are elements in life that are not merely material. We possess not only tables and chairs, but courage and love, fear and desire. These latter examples are not empirical "things," yet they are quite real and manage to exert a great deal of "power" over our lives. Further, and most important, there are activities of the soul which strive for such non-empirical notions as justice and goodness. In the light of these examples of non-empirical activity, the stranger concludes that the materialists must modify their position and admit that some things are real without being material (245e-247e), Once this is done, then the giants will be prepared for the next confrontation.

But the defenders of the Forms must also yield a point. The Parmenidean principle states that Reality (Being) must be a unity (One) without change (Changeless). Friends of this principle adjust its radical formulation by admitting a distinction between the world of Becoming and the world of Real Being. The former is the Heraclitean flux which we come to "know" through our changing bodily sensations. The latter is the realm of the Forms which we came to know through our intellect. Between these two worlds, the defenders say, there is an unbridgeable separation, and all Reality, furthermore, is to be located only in the unchanging world of the Forms (248a).

It is this radical separation (of Change and the Changeless) that the friends (7) of the Forms must yield. To achieve this concession, the stranger focuses upon the kind of "intercourse" that is involved in our knowledge of the Forms. The friends claim that knowledge rests upon the intellect's grasp of the (Changeless) Forms. But if this is so (as Plato does indeed believe), then these friends of the Forms must see that such knowledge involves the activity of the soul's intelligence. But this is to say that some things are acting (i.e., the soul's intellect) and some things are acted upon (i.e., the Forms). Such movement was initially consigned by the friends to the illusionary realm of Becoming (where things are always in a process of interaction -- as, for example, in Plato's "twin-offspring" theory of perception). Yet now it must be admitted that a certain amount of change and activity be credited as being wholly-- "Real." For if a knowledge of the Forms be possible (as the friends themselves claim), then this knowledge can only arise through a certain kind of dynamic interaction ("intercourse"). As such, the friends of the Forms must concede that change itself can be Real (248b-249b). With this, both sides of the battle have moved closer to a mutual understanding. The giants have been brought to admit some non-materiality.* It remains for a true lover of wisdom to bring both these sides together. This is precisely what Plato does. "Like a child begging for both," the whole of Reality must contain both change (which involves the activity of an intellect immersed in the flux of sensation) and the Changeless (the realm of the Forms as the mark of the "really Real," and the homeland of all true knowledge). This, in effect, is Plato's synthesis of the Heraclitean principle of Becoming and the Parmenidean principle of Being: "Reality is both at once - - all that is unchangeable and all that is change" (249d).

The resolution shall occur through the use of philosophical dialectic. Such a process will involve the two fundamental movements of Collection and Division, but this time such a "collecting" and "dividing" will take place solely within the realm of the Forms qua Forms. The movement of philosophical dialectic will thus adhere strictly to the logic of the Forms themselves. That is to say, the stranger will be interested in discovering the precise manner in which certain Forms "blend" (logically combine) with one another, and the precise manner in which certain Forms cannot "blend" with one another. The investigation has as its purpose the resolution of the problem of negative statements through the use of philosophical dialectic. The goal is to establish the sense in which that which "is" can in some manner "not be" and vice versa.

The Forms that are to be investigated are, initially, the elementary Forms of Existence, Rest, and Motion.* Through the use of dialectic the stranger deduces that the Forms of both Rest and Motion combine with the Form entitled "Existences" but that the Form of Rest will not combine with Motion. That is, when we say "rest exists" (or "rest is real") we really say that the Form of Rest partakes of the Form of Existence, as when Rest blends with Existence in the meaningful statement: "Rest exists" or "Rest is". But we note also that we cannot truly say "Rest moves,'' and, Plato would argue, the ultimate reason for our inability to speak of this truly lies in the nature of the two Forms themselves and the fact that neither can combine with one another (while both, nevertheless, can combine separately with the Form of Existence). Such is an example of the "dialectic" of the Forms -- their modes of interaction and the manner in which we can grasp their natures. The stranger now proceeds to resolve the stated problem.

The elementary Forms of Sameness and Difference are added to our first samples. With these new Forms collected (i.e., intuited as a whole), the stranger continues the dialectic. Each of the previous elementary Forms (viz., Rest, Motion, and Existence) turns out to be the same as itself (e.g., "Rest is Rest"), yet different from the others (e.g., "Rest is not Motion) (254d). The natures of Sameness and Difference will provide us with our solution, for the fact that Sameness and Difference combine in various ways with the previous Forms yields the sense in which something which is can also not be and vice versa. For example, by first applying the "logic" of Sameness and Difference to the "logic" of Rest, Motion, and Existence,we are able to generate the following (true) statements (255e-256c):

1 (a) "Motion is not (i.e., is different from) Rest,"
(b) Nevertheless, "Motion is (i.e., Motion partakes of the Form Existence),"

2 (a) "Motion is the same as itself (i.e., Motion partakes of Sameness, as when we say 'Motion is Motion'),"
(b) But, Motion is not the Same (i.e., the Form of Motion is not the Form of Sameness)."

And with this, the stranger--through the use of the realm of the Forms, and with the aid of dialectics--has been able to solve a philosophical problem. There is now a sense in which that which "is not" can yet "be" (1a,b), and a sense in which that which "is" can yet "not be" (2a,b).

*These can be distinguished from the "deeper" Forms such as Beautiful (Phaedrus, Symposium) and the Good (Republic). We will not include the "trivial" Forms such as Mud or Hair (as discussed by the young Socrates in the Parmenides), since these are not referred to into more mature theory.

A further example will allow us to see how negativity (i.e., the "is not") can become a natural and unproblematical part of many statements. Here the stranger appeals to the Forms of Difference and Existence (257a-258a):

3 (a) "Existence is (i.e., it exists),"

(b) "Existence is not (i.e., is different from) any other Form."

The idea of Difference gives us an innumerable amount of negative statements. For example, the Beautiful is (i.e., partakes of Existence), but the Beautiful is not (i.e., is different from) Existence--it also is not ugly, crude, courageous and so forth. Thus, through an understanding of the Form of Difference, we have arrived at an understanding of the "is not" (257b), and it is this understanding that allows us to move beyond the Parmenidean prohibition. For in Plato's description of Reality (a description which relies upon the notion of the Forms), there is room for the existence of "that which is not", this "non-being" now grasped as the function of Difference in producing valid negative statements (258d-e).

III False Speaking and False thinking: the Nature of Sophistry (260a-268d).

"That which is not" has existence owing to the fact that various Forms can blend with one another, thus producing a vast variety of possible combinations. This blending of the Forms, the stranger now continues, allows us to have discourse, for speaking implies that the Forms can "weave together" (260a). For example, when one says "Rest is not motion" one is saying that rest is different from motion and, further, one is implying that rest will not "blend" with motion. The point here is that, for Plato, language (either spoken or thought) is bound up with the play of the Forms.

This is important for the present part, since the discussion of negative statements has yielded a sense in which "non-being" pervades Reality (e.g., it is really true that rest is not motion, etc.), and, if language is bound up with the blending of the Forms, then "that which is not" allows for the possibility of falsity in speech and thought (260b-c). And this is of the utmost importance, since false speaking and false thinking were the specialty of the Sophist (the one who appears wise, and who says of things that they are, that they are not, and of things that are not, that they are). For this reason, the stranger proposes that they investigate the nature of speaking (and thinking, which is but "silent speech"). They begin with the simplest form of speaking, namely, the statement.

It is composed, we are reminded, of "names" (nouns) and verbs. These words, furthermore, are not merely mixed together (e.g., "walks runs sleeps"), but are combined in an ordered fashion which allows them to convey information. For example, this simple statement: "Theatetus sits." The stranger then adds to this a second statement: "Theatetus flies." The question now becomes, How are we to characterize these statements? It is here that the notions of truth and falsity enter the realm of speaking and thinking.

The first statement (assuming Theatetus is in fact sitting) states of things that are, that they are, and is properly characterized as true. Whereas the second statement states things that are different from the things that are and, accordingly, states "things that are not" as "being." This second example is therefore to be characterized as false (263a-c).

[If we appeal to the Cratylus for a moment, we may see more clearly the role that the elementary Forms play in the unfolding of these true and false statements. For Plato, a word or name for either things or actions has both a fixed meaning and a particular reference. The "fixed meaning" refers to the definition, nature, or Form of the thing or action whereas the particular reference merely points to the use of the term at a particular moment. Furthermore, proper names like "Theatetus" or "Socrates" stand for existing things only. With this as a background, we may proceed to construct a diagram for the previous examples of true and false statements:

(1) True statement

Form (Meaning):

Sitting

means

True

statement:"Theatetus sits"

stands stands

for for

Existing fact:Theatetus sitting

(States of things that are, that they are.)

(2) False statement

Form (Meaning): Flying- Sitting

means

False statement: "Theatetus flies."

stands stands

for for a

fact that

"is, not"

Existing fact: Theatetus sitting

(States of things that are not, that they are.)

In the later example, we have a case of a statement stating something (Theatetus flying) that is different from that which is the case (Theatetus sitting). Consequently, we have a statement that states of "what is not" that it "is" and this, according to the stranger, is an example of a combination of names and verbs that yields a "really and truly false statement" (Sophist 263c).]

We may resume our place in the dialogue. The nature of a false statement has allowed Theatetus to understand the nature of false speaking and, with this, we have all moved closer to capturing the nature of the Sophist, the one who practices the art of false speaking. We need merely note that thinking is simply an "inward discourse carried on without spoken word" (263e), and that judgement is merely the addition of assertion or denial to the statement that has been made (263e- 264a). Since both thinking and judging are related to speaking and statement, the stranger has shown the manner in which there can exist falsity in all of the above. The solution to the problem of falsehood has thus given us an account of false speaking, false thinking, and false judgement. And, with this, we have accordingly caught sight of the Sophist.

Recalling the earlier divisions that were made in this search for the nature of the Sophist, the stranger once again pursues the productive art of semblance making. As a deceiver (who is often deceived himself in thinking that he knows something that he really doesn't know), the Sophist is able to produce the appearance of being wise whilst really not being wise. And since this Sophist can no longer claim that such "non-being" has no reality, the stranger has finally cornered him in his own realm. All that remains is to draw out the final characterizations. The Sophist is called a human producer of images who makes out of himself the semblance of being wise and creates in others, through private conversation, the belief that he really is wise (264c-268d). Put schematically, the essence of the Sophist is captured in the following division:

Art

Acquisitive

Productive

Divine

of originals

(e.g., trees)

of images

(e.g., the

shadows

of trees)

Human

of originals

(e.g., building a

house)

of images (e.g.,

a drawing of a

house)

likenesses

(exact copies)

semblances

(distorted

appearances)

by tools

(e.g., large sculpture)

by mimicry (impersonation)

with knowledge

(acting)

with ignorance (false conceit)

simple minded

deceitful (insincere)

the Demagogue (public life)

the Sophist (private life)

Concluding Remarks: After such a long and, at times, belabored search for the Sophist, it is important to remind ourselves of the basic movements within the dialogue as a whole. The quest for the nature of the Sophist became involved with the problems of deceit and falsity when it was discovered that the art of Sophistry entails the ability to produce an image of oneself as appearing wise while not being wise (218d-237a). It was precisely at this point that the dialogue took up the problems of "Reality" and "Non-being" (237a-251a). These problems exhibit a double place within Plato's philosophical task.

First, the problem of Non-being can be seen as referring to the sophistical paradox expressed in the Parmenidean prohibition that one cannot possibly speak of that which "is not." Yet, since the Sophist apparently lived*through the various nuances of negativity in order to establish the exact sense in which that which "is not" can also "be." This was the task of the section on negative statements (251a259d), and the conclusion was that false speaking and false thinking can indeed arise by stating of things that are, that they are not, and by stating of things that are not, that they are. This analysis of the nature of falsehood allowed the stranger to continue the final division of the Sophist, and to capture his prey in the realm of image-making and deception (260a-268d).

But there is a second, and deeper,reason for the investigations of Reality and Non-being. To see this, we must place the Sophist back into relationship with its companion dialogue, the Theaeteus. Recall that the problem of the Theaetetus was the problem of knowledge, and that it dealt with its topic through an investigation of perception and judgement (the latter involving a discussion of "false beleif" and "belief accompanied by an account"). Each attempt at a resolution of the problem, however, ended in a vague realization that the dialogue was somehow limited by the approach that it was taking. We may now see that the dialogue was limited because it remained within the Heraclitean world of sense impression and becoming, and that it lacked an appeal to the realm of the Forms. At bottom, the Theaetetus failed because it lacked a full sense of Reality taken as a whole. This full sense of Reality is completed in the Sophist. The strangers discussion of Reality and the problem of Non-being ultimately fulfills the task of the Theaetetus by allowing us to grasp the true nature of knowledge. That is to say, the problem of knowledge is to be located within the more general problem of Reality. This latter problem is resolved in Plato's synthesis of the Heraclitean Principle of Becoming and the Parmenidean Principle of Being; the former being grasped through the senses, the latter being grasped through the intellect. The first "world" becomes the home of changing sensation and mere opinion, the second "worlds' becomes the home of the *[Insert]: in that realm of the "is not" (and falsehood in general), it became necessary to think Forms and true knowledge. Both worlds together yield the whole of Reality.

Now with this picture of Reality, the Sophist simultaneously completes the problem of the Theaetetus and points toward the images of the Divided Line and the Cave in the Republic. For here we have a first sketch of the Divided Line:

The Whole of Reality )

Thought and

Knowledge

Sensation and

belief

The realm of

the Forms

The realm of

sensible being

The Changeless (The

Parmenidean Principle

of Being)

The Changing (The

Heraclitean Principle of Becoming)

It is at this point that we can place the meaning of this dialogue within the general flow of the text of Plato for Beginners. It has been our intent to present the essence of Plato's philosophy through a careful attending to his development of the theory of the Forms. This theory, which marks the movement beyond the radical limitation of the "Socratic Plato," is presented along the two paths of eras and knowledge. The former path led us to experience the presence of the Form of the Beautiful and, indeed, the realm of the "deeper" Forms in general. The path of knowledge showed us the role that the "elementary" Forms play in dialectical understanding and true discourse. Both paths reveal the manner in which the permanent Forms interweave with our mortal experience.

Furthermore, both paths--and explicitly the path of knowledge--reveal Plato's "two-world" picture of Reality, and his emphasis upon the intellectual intuition of the Forms. In the discussions of the Republic, this "two-world" theory is presented schematically in the drawing of the Divided Line , and it is portrayed metaphorically in the image of the Cave. The first fills-in the theory of the Forms by carefully describing the precise levels of Reality with regard to our knowledge of these levels. The second fulfills the promise of a total vision of the Forms through a metaphorical description of our human condition, and the manner in which we as mortals can transcend the world of Becoming and fix our gaze upon the highest of the Forms. Our present movement toward the Republic is thus the culmination of the general movement of the text itself.